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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant's motor vehicle collided with a snow 
removal truck owned by the State of Utah, as the 
driver-employee of the State Highway Department 
was negotiating a left turn at the intersection of 9th 
South and State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on De-
cember 30, 1966 at 1: 15 a.m. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, pre-
siding, entered judgment in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff no cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent requests the court to affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 30th day of December, 1966, at approxi-
mately 1: 15 a.m., at the intersection of 9th South 
Street and State Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, a driver of Respondent's vehicle was 
negotiating a left turn from the position between 
the left turn holding lane and the through lane of 
east bound traffic on 9th south into the center lane 
of north bound traffic on State Street to complete 
the "salt" spreading necessary to eliminate the snow 
hazard on the highway. Yellow warning lights were 
flashing and a roto beam amber light mounting on 
the cab of the 1965 International Truck owned by 
Respondent, was in operation. Respondent's driver 
was proceeding to turn left on the appropriate green 
light, having a1lowed immediate traffic to pass. Ap-
pellant was driving a 1959 Ford Ranchero proceed-
ing westerly and collided with the Respondent's 
vehicle damaging the front end of appellant's ve-
hicle and the right side of respondent's truck. 
The collision occurred approximately fifteen to 
twenty feet east of the northeast comer of the inter-
section. 
Appellant testified that he first saw the Respon-
dent's truck when he was approximately 225 feet 
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east of the intersection (R-223) and the next time he 
saw the State Road Vehicle impact was inevitable, 
Appellant d8scribing the truck as "50 feet high and 
300 feet long" (R-2 l 6). 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT IN REVIEWING THE 
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE MUST VIEW THE EVIDENCE 
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE RESPON-
DENT AND SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT BELOW. 
Appellant has misapplied the holdings of this 
Court concerning appeals of non-suit judgments to 
the procedural determination announced by the 
Court below of "no cause of action." 
While it is true that non-suit judgments may be 
based upon "nc cause of action" the procedure 
whereby the defendant may move for a non-suit 
judgment following the presentation of the plaintiff's 
case is different from the facts of the instant case. 
After the presentation of both the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's evidence and testimony, the Court reached 
a conclusion of negligence on the part of the ap-
pellant. There being no cross-claim against the ap-
pellant by the respondent, the Court held there be 
"no cause of action." 
The appeal record does not contain a motion 
for "non-suit." "Non-suit" and "no cause of action" 
are not symnonymous terms. The appellant's argu-
ment mus~ be disregarded and the better reasoning 
4 
of the Court in cases such as the instant appeal 
should be followed. 
"It is elementary that where there is dispute 
in the evidence, resolving the conflicts is for 
the jury under its prerogative as to the exclusive 
finder of facts. It is equally so that because of the 
jury's verdict in his favor, we accept the re-
spondent's version of the facts and review the 
evidence and all inferences fairly to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him .... " 
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2nd 344, 400 P 2nd 
570, 572 ( 1965). 
It must be acknowledged that when a trial by 
jury is waived the trial judge is the exclusive finder 
of fact. The aforementioned holding of Simth v. Gal-
legos is applicable to the present appeal. This Court 
should, therefore, review the determination of the 
trial judge in a light most favorable to the respon-
dent. 
Affirming a decision of the trial judge sitting 
without a jury in an action arising out of an inter-
section collision, this court stated that: 
"Since reasonable minds could differ in re-
solving the questions of contributory negligence 
and proximate cause, we cannot disturb the trial 
judges determination of them." Country Club 
Foods v. Barney, 10 Utah 2nd 317, 319, 352 P 
2nd776 (1960). 
Judgment in the lower Court was entered fol-
lowing a complete hearing of the arguments by 
opposing counsel. The determination of the trial 
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judge was properly determined based upon the op-
portunity to evaluate the evidence and testimony 
and is not a judgment of "non-suit." 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should review 
the action in the light most favorable to the prevail-
ing party and affirm the judgment of the lower 
Court against the plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR OF THE LOWER COURT 
IN ENTERING JUDGMENT WHICH STATED TWO 
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE APPELLANT WHEN THE 
ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT STATED ONLY ONE ACT 
OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Statutory procedure set forth in rule 52, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
specifies that: 
In all actions tried upon facts without a jury .... 
this Court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A. 
This Court has held that an appeal will not be 
entertained from the decision announced by the trial 
judge from the bench as only final judgment en-
tered in accordance with law are appealable. Watson 
v. O'Dell, 176 P 619, 53 Ut. 96 (1918); Ellinwood v. Ben-
nion, 73 Ut. 563, 276 P 159 (1929). 
An order for a judgment is itself not a 
judgment and an appeal does not lie from it as a 
final judgment, 
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Long standing precedence of this Court has 
established that a trial may enter judgment which 
differs from the decision announced at the close of 
the trial proceedings. Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Ut. 27 4, 
415 P 2nd 662, 663 (J 966). 
That the written judgment supercedes the oral 
statement of the court is not questioned. Mc-
Collum v. Clothifr, 121 Ut. 3 11, 241P2nd 468 
(1952); Walker Bank v. Walker Case No. 10374, 
17 Ut. 2nd 390, 412 P 2nd 920, 1966; that the 
written judgment also supercedes the minute 
entry see Harffwd Accident tJ Tnd('/nnity Com-
pany v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P 2nd 919. 
Announcing this criteria the Court inMcCollum 1. 
Clotherier, supra, at 472 held: 
The only judgment that can be given effect is 
the one entered in accordance with bw. " .... no 
antecedent expression of the judge can in any 
way restrict his ab5olute power to declare his final 
conclusion in the only manner authorized by 
law, to wit: by filing his 'decision' (Findings of 
Fact and Conclmions of Law .... ") Phillip v. 
Hooper, 43 Cal App 1nd 467, 111 P 2nd 22, 
23. "Oral statements of opinion by the trial court 
inconsistent with the findings ultimately rendered 
do not effect the final judgment. (citation omit-
ted)" 




THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THE APPELLANT NEGLGENT IN FAILING TO KEEP 
AN APPROPRIATE LOOKOUT. 
Appellant's testimony clearly shows that the 
Court, as a trier of fact, could reasonably conclude 
that the appellant failed to keep an appropriate 
lookout. Excerpts taken from the testimony of the 
appellant from the trial transcript, (R 219) indicates 
the following question? 
Q. (by Mr. Frank) How many times do you 
recall seeing the truck?" 
"A. I noticed the truck as it was coming 
down, the next thing I knew it was when it 
was in front of me and I hit it." 
The amended left turn statute, § 41-6-73, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, has placed a duty upon the 
driver when negotiating a left turn to determine if 
there are any vehicles approaching from the op-
posite direction which would constitute a hazard. 
The Court in Smith 11• Gallegos, supra, at 572, also 
also placed the duty of care upon the driver pro-
ceeding thru the intersection. 
"Notwithstanding the onerous duty now im-
posed upon the left turner by the new statute 
he is entitled to assume that other drivers will 
also be conforming to the requirements of law by 
keeping within the speed limit, by keeping a 
proper lookout and by keeping proper control 
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over their cars and by using reasonable care for 
the safety of themselves and others." 
Additional caution is imposed upon the driver 
of a vehicle approaching an intersection displaying 
warning lamps by the motor vehicle code, § 41-6-133 
(d) Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Any vehicle may be equipped with lamps 
which may be used for the purpose of warning 
the operators of other vehicles of the presence 
of vehicular traffic hazard requiring the exer-
cise of unusual care in approaching, or overtak-
ing or passing and when so equipped may display 
such warning in addition to any other warning 
signals required by this act. 
There was sufficient testimony presented to the 
Court to show that the appellant's vehicle was dis-
playing warning signals required by § 41-6-140.20 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Snow removal equipment and other work ve-
hicles-
The State Road Commission sh a 11 adopt 
standards and specifications applicable to .... 
other lamps on snow removal machinery when 
operated on the highway, .... such standards 
and specifications must require the use of flash-
ing lights visible from all directions and for 
identification distinct as to color. 
Standards for light on snow and ice control 
equipment effective on the morning of December 
30, 1966, were approved March 16, 1960 by the State 
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Road Commlssion. The Commission adopted the 
policy of the American Association of State Highway 
Officials on "Standard Identification Lights for Snow 
and Ice Control Equipment". The pertinent specifi-
cations are: 
( c) The lights shall be flashing or be of 
the revolving type .... 
( d) Amber in color 
Duty of care of a driver approaching an author-
ized snow removal vehicle displaying the approved 
warning light authorized by the Department of 
Highways, is set forth in § 41-6-140 Utah Code An-
notated 1953 prior to the amendment of 1967, and is 
therefore the criteria for establishing the negligence 
of the appellant on December 30, 1966. The pertinent 
language is as follows: 
( c) flashing lights are prohibited except 
on . . . . an authorized . . . . snow removal or 
other authorized work vehicle or machinery, .... 
as a means of indicating .... the presence of a 
vehicle traffic haz.1rd requiring unusual care in 
approaching, overtaking or passing. 
The emphasized language of this section was 
identical with § 41-6-133 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
and was eliminated in 1967 Laws of Utah 1967 Chap-
ter 92. The amended section § 41-6-140 was utilized 
to specify the restrictions of lighting devices rather 
than setting forth the duty of care of the approaching 
driver as § 41-6-133 provisions apply to all vehicles 
authorized to display warning lamps. 
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Appellant testified that he observed the re-
spondents truck when he was approximately 225 
feet east of the intersection, trial transcript (R-223). 
The Court also presented questions to the ap-
pellant in order to clarify the question of the applica-
tion of brakes (R. 216). 
The Court: . . . . How far were you from 
the truck by your best estimate when you applied 
the brakes? 
Witness: Distance wise it is awful diffi-
cult to say. I was coming up to the intersection 
slow and the light turned green and I started to 
proceed on thru, the next thing I know the truck 
is right in front of me. It is fifty feet high and 
three hundred feet long and distance wise I 
couldn't tell. ... 
Appellant did not proceed with "unusual care," 
after first observing the Respondent's vehicle. Trial 
testimony of the appellant as to his own lookout was 
sufficient to present the court with the basis of the 
findings of "failure to maintain a proper lookout." 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS TRAVELING AT AN 
EXCESSIVE SPEED FOR EXISTING CONDITIONS. 
Pertaining to the findings of excessive speed 
the trial judge was correct in weighing all evidence 
and testimony. Appellant has presented to this 
Court the fact that the only testimony as to the speed 
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of he appellant's vehicle was from the testimony 
of the appellant who stated this his speed was "15, 
16, 17 miles per hour" (R 188 and 193). 
This Court has stated in Johnson v. Cornwall, 15 
Utah 2nd 17'.2, 174, 389 P 2nd 710 (1954), that a state-
ment as to the speed by the drivers of a truck in-
volved in a left turn intersection accident were 
"more estimates and the iury was not bound to be-
lieve them". 
In cases tried without a jury, the trial judge is 
given a responsibility of the finder of facts and may 
weigh all evidence and testimony. In Kiepe v. LeChemi-
nant, 17 Utah 2nd 141, 4th 18 Pac. 2nd 894, 896 (1966) 
this Court stc.ted: 
The duty to make findings rest primarily upon 
the trial court which is in a better position to 
determine the weight of the testimony than the 
Supreme Court, Echer v. Hatch, 70 Ut. 1 257 
Pac. 673. 
Testimony as to the estimate of speed could be 
weighed by the trier of facts together with statements 
of the intent of the appellant as he approached the 
intersection. (R. 188) 
Question: As you approached the intersec-
tion of 9th South and State, what if anything, 
did you observe? 
Amwer: Well, I was keeping my eyes pretty 
well open on what was going on in the road and 
I was looking north and south as far as I could 
see there to be sure that things were slowing 
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down and coming to a halt so that I could pro-
ceed on thru without stopping the truck when 
the light turned green. 
Determination by the trial judge of the excessive 
speed for existing conditions could properly be con-
cluded from the evJdence presented concerning 
weather conditions, point of impact, and failure to 
use "unusual care" in proceeding past the vehicle 
displaying an amber warning light. 
The existing conditions in the intersection spe-
cifically stated in findings of fact as presented to 
this Court in the appeal record (R. 61-62) constituted 
an actual hazard demanding strict ad herence to the 
provisions of § 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
( 1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential haards then exist-
ing. In every event, speed shall be so controlled 
as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any 
pei:son, vehicle, or other conveyance .... 
( 3) The driver of every vehicle shall, con-
sistent with the requirements of sub-division ( 1) 
of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced 
speed when approaching or crossing an intersec-
tion . . . . and when special hazards exist with 
respect .... other traffic or by reason of weather 
or highway conditions. 
Testimony offered by appellant under direct ex-
amination by his own counsel (R. 88) indicates that 
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he was intending to avoid the necesstiy of stopping 
at the intersection and maintained a steady speed 
to the point where impact was inevitable. 
Appellant's failure to control his speed "having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing" i.e. snow upon the highway and presence of 
snow removal equipment in the intersection with 
roto-beam warning light in operation, resulting in 
a collision in violation of the above subsection (1) 
requiring that "speed shall be so controlled as may 
be necessary to avoid colliding with any .... ve-
hicle" may be "regarded as prima fade evidence of 
negligence", Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 
30, 395 P.2d 62, Klaf fa v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65 404 P.2d 
659 (1965). 
POINT V 
THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE DRIVER OF RESPONDENTS VEHICLE EXERCISED 
THE DEGREE OF CARE IN NEGOTIATING A LEFT 
TURN AS IS IMPOSED BY LAW. 
U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-73, Vehicle Turning Left at In-
tersection: 
The driver of a vehicle within an intersec-
tion intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which is within the intersec-
tion or so close thereto as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, during the time when such 
driver is moving within the intersection. 
14 
The Court has recently interpreted the language 
of this provision in the case of Smith 11. Gallego1, supra, 
at 572: 
If the left turner in performing his duty, and 
in making the required observation, sees no ve-
hicle approaching, or that any coming is far 
enough away so that he can reasonably believe 
that he has time to make his turn, he may pro-
ceed. 
Prior to the amendment of Section 41-6-73, this 
Court considered what constituted "immediate haz-
ard" in regards to left turn situations. 
Richards v. Anderson, Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959): 
There is, of course, no precise set of meas-
urements by which an immediate hazard can be 
gauged. It must be judged on the basis of com-
mon sense in the light of existing circumstances. 
In reference to a similar situation the Supreme 
Court of Delaware has said that an "immediate 
hazard" is created when a vehicle approaches 
an intersection on a favored street at a reasonable 
speed under such circumstances that, if the dis-
favored driver proceeds into the intersection it 
will force the favored driver to sharply and sud-
denly check his progress or stop in order to avoid 
collision. Conversely, if the disfavored driver has 
made his stop and deferred to all vehicles that 
would be required to go into a sharp or sudden 
braking to avoid collision, the cars far enough 
away have a clear margin to observe and make a 
smooth and safe stop are not an "immediate 
hazard" and are required to yield to the driver 
already at the intersection. 
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Appellants a_re mistaken in stating that "Mr. Ken-
nedy was guilty of statutory negligence." Appel-
lant's Brief, page 8. 
This Court has upon several occasions ruled 
that violation of a traffic, safety standard does not 
constitute negligence per se. In Klaffa i·. Smith, supra 
at 68, the Ccurt reaffirmed its previous decisions. 
"(T) his court has in a number of cases, but 
with slight variations in the language, reaffirmed 
the view. which we think is the correct one, that 
violation of a standard of safety set by statute 
or ordinance is to be regarded as prima facie 
evidence of negligence, but is subject to justifica-
tion or excuse if the evidence is such that it 
reasonably could be found that the conduct was 
nevertheless within the standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances." 
. We think the foregoing rule is the 
logical and reasonable one and in fact the only 
rule rhat can fairly be applied to the practical 
exigencies of human conduct and conform to our 
conception of law and justice." 
Respondent's equipment operator was proper-
ly executing a left turn into the center lane of the 
East half of State Street to proceed with the salt 
spreading which was necessary in the snow re-
moval assignment for the safety of the users of high-
ways of the State of Utah. 
Legislative enactment of requirements for the 
use of "flashing lights visible from all directions for 
identification, distinct as to color," to be used upon 
16 
"snow removal machinery when operated on the 
highways" specified that the use of such warning 
lamps was necessary to warn other drivers of the 
presence of such equipment. 
The operation of which may in hours of 
darkness necessitate par king in lanes of traffic, 
travelling against traffic sudden stops and other-
wise interfering with normal traffic flow. 
41-6-140.20, U.C.A., 1953. 
This statutory provisions indicates the legislative 
intent to grant to operators of such maintenance ve-
hicles certain exemptions from the ordinary "rules 
of the road" if necessary to perform the duties. 
Mr. Kennedy, driver of Respondent's snow re-
moval machinery, was diligent in his duties to ade-
quately spread the salt necessary to keep the snow 
covered highways of the State of Utah in condition 
for geenral usage by other vehicles. 
In the performance of his duties he was required 
to drive a motor vehicle equipped with a spreading 
device which was designed to be used, not in one 
single lane of traffic, but by straddling the lanes of 
traffic in order to spread a radius of approximately 
20 feet of roadway. 
Appellant contends that the driver of Respon-
dent's vehicles was negligent in negotiating a left 
turn from a position other than completely within 
the left turn holding lane. The court below properly 
concluded that although the Respondent's driver 
had straddled the left turn lane and the left through 
lanes of traffic on Ninth South in moving into a posi-
17 
tion to enter State Street in a position approximately 
straddling the left through lane and center lane of 
traffic, that driver had exercised the duty of care im-
posed by Jaw. 
Legislative intent in the creation of the Highway 
Code is codified as 27-12-1, U.C.A., 1953 and speci-
fies that: 
"The legislature intends to declare, in general 
terms, the powers and duties of the state road 
commission, leaving specific details to be deter-
mined by reasonable rules and regulations which 
may be promulgated by the commission." 
Regulations imposed upon Mr. Kennedy in the 
performance of his "salting" procedure included 
the requirement that the warning amber lights, 
mounted on the high bumper of the truck be flash-
ing; that the roto-beam amber light be functioning 
to warn drivers of other vehicles of the presence of 
a potential hazard; that he obey the signal lights 
and other traffic signs; that he yield to other traffic 
having the right of way. 
Having taken all of the foregoing precautions, 
the driver is then granted an exception to the "rules 
of the road." When necessary in the performance 
of his duties, the driver may drive straddling the 
lanes of traffic, and if it is necessary to make a wide 
turn at an intersection to be in the position of strad-
dling two lanes, this is within the authority of the 
State Highway Commission to direct the driver to 
operate the equipment in this manner. 
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Sufficient testimony was presented to the trial 
court, within the full scope of direct, redirect, and 
cross examination to justify the conclusion of law 
entered by the Lower Court No. 3. That the driver 
of defendant's vehicle exercised the degree of care 
in negotiating a. left turn as is imposed by law." 
Upon direct examination by Mr. Cotro-Manes, 
attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, of Chauncey Eugene 
Kennedy, driver of Respondent's State Road Com-
mission Sanding Vehicle, the following testimony 
was offered, (R 125): 
Q ... Now, when the light turned green 
what did you then do Mr. Kennedy? 
A I started out into the intersection and 
slowly and when it appeared that the traffic go-
ing west had halted I noticed one car that had 
stopped there and I though that he was going to 
let me through so I continued. I went on with 
making my turn. 
Q What made you think he was going to 
let you through? 
A Because he was stopped. 
The court also questioned Mr. Kennedy to clari-
fy the observation of traffic made by him prior to 
negotiating the left turn: (R 166). 
I understood you to say this morning other 
cars had come through. Finally, this one you 
thought stopping for the light or stopping for 
you so you started to turn. l5 that right or 
wrong? 
19 
THE \X'ITNESS: Well, that would be right 
but I couldn't tell you how many cars. 
Mr. Nicholas V. Grip was called as a witness on 
behalf of the Plaintiff and testified as follows: 
Q . . . Could you describe for us what 
you saw? 
A Well, I noticed the State vehicle going 
east from-let's see. East on Ninth South making 
a left turn on State Street. 
Q And what else did you see? 
A And I saw a small wagon-a kind of 
pickup truck plow right into him. 
In answer to Mr. Cotro-Manes question as to 
the speed of Respcmdent's truck the same witness 
testified: 
A Now, that is not easy to say except I 
know he was going very slow; going into a turn 
and spraying sand so he was going very slow. 
Mr. Grip also testified that he did not see the 
Appellant's vehicle before the impact (R 107). 
The trial court judge was correct in holding that 
the driver of Defendant's vehicle exercised the de-
gree of care in negotiating a left turn as is imposed 
by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to present arguments in its 
brief sufficient to show error upon which this court 
could grant reversal cf the lower court's decision. 
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. The judgment and proceedings in the 
lower court are presmptively correct with the 
burden upon defendant (appellant) to show 
error." Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 
680, 681. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the court below should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
2 3 6 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
